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This paper attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two
strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on
economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a
positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private
domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000).
On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that
monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best
predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski
and Reinhart 1999). This paper starts by illustrating these opposing effects
by, first, analyzing the dynamics of output growth and financial intermediation
around systemic banking crises and, second, showing that the growth
enhancing effects of financial depth are weaker in countries that experienced
such crises. After these illustrative exercises, the paper attempts an
empirical explanation of the apparently opposing effects of financial
intermediation. This explanation is based on a distinction between transitory
and trend effects of domestic credit aggregates on economic growth.
Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the
paper estimates an encompassing model of long- and short-run effects,
following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)’s Pooled Mean Group Estimator.
The main result of the paper is that a positive long-run relationship between
financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative
short-run relationship.
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FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND GROWTH 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two strands 
of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.  On the 
one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of measures of private 
domestic credit and liquid liabilities on per capita GDP growth.  This is interpreted as the 
growth enhancing effect of financial development (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck, 2000).  On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature 
finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors for 
crises (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Degatriache, 1998 and 2000; Gourinchas, Landerretche, 
and Valdes, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  Since banking crises usually lead to 
recessions, an expansion of domestic credit would then be associated to growth 
slowdowns.   
A similar divide exists at the theoretical level.  According to the endogenous 
growth literature, financial deepening leads to a more efficient allocation of savings to 
productive investment projects (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1991). Conversely, the financial crisis literature points to the destabilizing effect 
of financial liberalization as it leads to overlending.  Overlending would occur through a 
combination of channels, including a limited monitoring capacity of regulatory agencies, 
the inability of banks to discriminate good projects during investment booms, and the 
existence of an explicit or implicit insurance against banking failures (Shneider and 
Tornell, 2000; Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 1999).  Not surprisingly, each strand of 
the literature has produced its own set of policy implications.  Thus, researchers that 
emphasize the findings of the endogenous growth literature advocate financial 
liberalization and deepening (e.g., Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), while those that 
concentrate on crises caution against ￿excessive￿ financial liberalization (e.g., Balino and 
Sundarajan, 1991; Gavin and Hausman, 1995). 
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate from an empirical perspective. In 
section II we examine how the relationship between measures of financial depth and 
economic growth is affected by the presence of financial crises.  For this purpose, we first   3
describe the behavior of financial intermediation and output growth around episodes of 
banking crises. We then reconsider the evidence on the positive growth effect of financial 
deepening by analyzing whether this effect is weaker in countries afflicted by financial 
crises.  
In section III the paper attempts an empirical explanation of the apparently 
contradictory effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.  This explanation 
is based on the distinction between cycle and trend changes of financial intermediation 
and their corresponding effects on output growth.  Working with a panel of cross-country 
and time-series observations, we estimate an encompassing model of long- and short-run 
effects.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL DEPTH AND GROWTH IN THE PRESENCE 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
  In this section we examine how the relationship between measures of financial 
depth and economic growth is affected by the presence of financial crises.  First, we 
describe the behavior over time of financial intermediation and output growth around 
banking crises.  We do it by using an event-study methodology applied to a panel of 
countries that have experienced such crises, as identified by Caprio and Klingbiel (1999).  
Second, we revisit the evidence on the positive growth effect of financial deepening by 
testing whether this effect is weaker in countries that have experienced banking crises.  
For this purpose, we follow the GMM cross-country panel-data approach to growth 
empirics in Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).
1 
A. The behavior of financial intermediation and economic activity around 
episodes of financial crises 
  Here we describe the behavior of financial intermediation and economic activity 
in a typical country before and after the start of a banking crisis. We use total liquid 
liabilities and domestic credit to the private sector, both as ratios to GDP, as the measures 
of financial intermediation.  Economic activity is measured with total and per capita GDP 
growth rates.   
                                                 
1 See also Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997), and Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza (2000).    4
We first identify the episodes of banking crises for a large sample of countries 
following Caprio and Klingbiel (1999).  According to the Caprio and Klingbiel 
classification, a systemic banking crisis is a situation where all or most of the capital of 
the banking system is eroded. In this situation, even if some banks stay solvent, the net 
worth of the banking system as a whole is negative. A banking crisis is almost always 
associated with a ratio of non-performing assets larger than 10% and a rescue cost higher 
than 2% of annual GDP. The list of countries and time periods where systemic banking 
crises occurred is given in Appendix A.   
Second, applying an event-study methodology, we make country experiences 
comparable by re-scaling calendar time into crisis-centered time for each country.   
Moreover, to eliminate country-specific effects, we demean each observation with the 
corresponding country average.  
We focus the analysis on the 12-year widow centered on the start of the banking 
crisis.  Figure 1 presents the behavior of the typical country-year observation, which is 
given by the median across countries in a particular year for each measure of financial 
intermediation and output growth.  Table 1 presents Students￿ t-tests for the significance 
of level and correlation changes over the 12-year period. 
  Both liquid liabilities and private credit rise rapidly before the crisis then drop 
drastically once it starts.  They recover partially in the following years but remain far 
below their pre-crisis levels.  On the other hand, total and per capita GDP growth rates 
fall in the years prior to the banking crisis, reach the bottom at the onset of the crisis, and 
recover gradually afterwards.  The correlation between the measures of financial 
intermediation and economic activity depend on the period where the correlation is 
computed.  In general, however, the correlation between growth and financial 
intermediation is negative in the years prior to and after the crisis.  In the case of private 
credit, its correlation with growth is strongly negative prior to the crisis, and it becomes 
close to neutral in the aftermath.   
In summary, this first exercise shows that credit booms do precede banking crisis 
and that the relationship between financial intermediation and growth is negative in the 
years surrounding banking crises.   5
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B. Revisiting the evidence on the growth effects of financial deepening 
Working with a large cross-section of countries, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) 
find a positive relationship between initial financial intermediation depth and subsequent 
long-run growth performance.  In these and related studies, the long-run growth rate is 
estimated as the average rate over periods of time as long as 25-30 years.  King and 
Levine use initial measures of financial intermediation (rather than, say, period averages) 
to be able to conclude that more developed financial systems lead to higher growth.   
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) address directly the issue of joint endogeneity of 
financial development through the use of instrumental variables in their growth 
regressions.  They use the countries￿ legal origin as the ￿external￿ instrument for 
financial depth in their cross-sectional regressions and the lagged observations of all 
explanatory variables as ￿internal￿ instruments in their pooled (cross-country and time-
series) regressions.  The data panels used by Levine et al. consist of about 74 countries 
and, for each of them, non-overlapping five-year averages covering the period 1960-95.  
They use five-year averages, rather than annual observations, to smooth out transitory or 
business-cycle fluctuations.  Confirming previous results, Levine et al. find robust 
evidence that financial development and depth lead to an improved growth performance.    
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for  Countries with Crisis Experience
  ANTE CRISIS PERIOD CRISIS PERIOD T-test P-Value
t-5 to the starting year of crisis, t t+1 to t+6 Ho: ante=crisis
Liquid Liabilities /GDP 0.047578843 0.007509945 0.07
OBS 48 50  
 Private Credit/ GDP 0.066891752 0.027435856 0.06
OBS 48 49  
Real Per Capita Growth -0.269641648 0.780450416 0.0157
OBS 56 53  
 Correlation (Liquid Liabilities, Growth) -0.1072 -0.1208 0.35
OBS 42 40
Correlation (Private Credit, Growth) -0.347 -0.18 0.07
OBS 42 41  7
  It is arguable that in most cases, using low-frequency data (such as averages over 
five or more years) allows the researcher to concentrate on long-run effects.  However, in 
cases of prolonged or deep recessions, such as those associated with financial crises, even 
averages over long periods may be contaminated by cycle effects.  Developing this 
argument, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) present evidence that while in cross-sectional 
regressions involving a worldwide sample of countries financial intermediation is 
positively linked with growth, in panel regressions for only Latin American countries, the 
relationship is negative.  They suggest that their results for Latin America may reflect the 
lasting impact of the repeated financial crises (and associated overlending) that the region 
has suffered.  However, De Gregorio and Guidotti do not offer direct evidence on the role 
of financial crises in distorting the financial intermediation and growth relationship.   
Moreover, it is possible that their contrasting results between the worldwide and Latin 
American samples are actually due to the use of cross-sectional vs. panel-data estimators.  
  We now analyze how the presence of financial crises modifies the estimated link 
between measures of financial intermediation and economic growth.  For this purpose, 
we work with the same data and methodology as in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) but 
allow for, respectively, a banking-crisis and a Latin America effect. 
  Data and Methodology 
  We work with a pooled data set consisting of 74 countries and, for each of them, 
at most 7 non-overlapping five-year periods spanning the years 1960-95.  The resulting 
panel of country and time-period observations is unbalanced.  Appendix B lists the 
countries included in the sample, and Appendix C presents the definitions and sources of 
the variables included in our empirical model. 
  We estimate a growth regression using panel data.  As standard in the literature, 
the regression equation is dynamic given that it includes the initial level of per capita 
output as an explanatory variable.  Apart from the measure of financial intermediation, 
the regression equation considers a set of control variables, including initial per capita 
output, average secondary school attainment of the adult population, the average ratio of 
government consumption to GDP, the average inflation rate, and the average black 
market premium on foreign exchange.      
The regression equation to be estimated is the following,   8
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where, y is the logarithm of real per capita output, CV is a set of control variables, FD is 
an indicator of financial depth, µ t is a time-specific effect, η i is an unobserved country-
specific effect, and ε  is the error term. The subscripts i,t represent country and time-
period, respectively.  We assess the banking-crisis and the Latin-America effects by 
introducing a slope dummy on the financial depth indicator. 
The proposed growth regression poses some challenges for estimation.  The first 
is the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects.  While the inclusion of 
period-specific dummy variables can account for the time effects, the common methods 
to deal with country-specific effects (￿within￿ or differences estimators) are inappropriate 
given the dynamic nature of the regression.  The second challenge is that most 
explanatory variables are likely to be jointly endogenous with economic growth.  Then 
we need to control for the biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation.  In the 
following paragraphs we outline the econometric methodology we use to control for 
unobserved country-specific effects and joint endogeneity in a dynamic model of panel 
data. 
Econometric methodology 
  We use the Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimators developed for 
dynamic models of panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 
(1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995).  Taking advantage of 
the panel nature of the data, these estimators are based on, first, differencing regressions 
and/or instruments to control for unobserved effects, and, second, using previous 
observations of the explanatory variables as instruments (which are called ￿internal￿ 
instruments).   
  After accounting for the time-specific effects and grouping all explanatory 
variables in a vector X, we can rewrite equation (1) as follows, 
yy X it it it i it ,, , , ’ =++ + − α β η ε   1         ( 2 )  
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  In order to eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first-differences of 
equation (2), 
 
() () ( ) yy y y XX it it it it it it it it ,, , , , , ,, ’ −= − + − + − −− − − − 11 2 1 1 αβ ε ε     (3) 
 
  The use of instruments is required to deal with (i) the likely endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables, and, (ii) the problem that, by construction, the new error term, 
ε ε it it ,, − − 1, is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, yy it it ,, −− − 12 .  Taking 
advantage of the panel nature of the data set, the instruments consist of previous 
observations of the explanatory and lagged dependent variables.  Given that it relies on 
past values as instruments, this method only allows current and future values of the 
explanatory variables to be affected by the error term.  Therefore, while relaxing the 
common assumption of strict exogeneity, our instrumental-variable method does not 
allow the X variables to be fully endogenous.   
  Under the assumptions that (a) the error term, ε , is not serially correlated, and (b) 
the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exogenous (i.e., the explanatory variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), the GMM dynamic 
panel estimator uses the following moment conditions. 
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  The GMM estimator based on these conditions is known as the difference 
estimator.  Notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel data estimators, 
there are important statistical shortcomings with the difference estimator.  Alonso-
Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak 
instruments for the regression equation in differences.  Instrument weakness influences 
the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the difference estimator.     10
Asymptotically, the variance of the coefficients rises.  In small samples, Monte Carlo 
experiments show that the weakness of the instruments can produce biased coefficients.
2   
  To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual 
difference estimator, we use a new estimator that combines in a system the regression in 
differences with the regression in levels (developed in Arellano and Bover 1995 and 
Blundell and Bond 1997).  The instruments for the regression in differences are the same 
as above.  The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the 
corresponding variables.  These are appropriate instruments under the following 
additional assumption: there should be no correlation between the change in the right-
hand-side variables and the country-specific effect (which does not preclude from 
correlation between the levels of these variables and the country-specific effect).  This 
assumption results from the following stationarity property, 
 
[ ] [ ]
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     ( 6 )  
 
  The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the 
regression in levels) are:
3 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0     , 2 , 1 , = + ⋅ − − − t i i t i t i y y E ε η         ( 7 )  
( ) ( ) [ ] 0     , 2 , 1 , = + ⋅ − − − t i i t i t i X X E ε η         ( 8 )  
 
Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8) 
and employ a GMM procedure to generate consistent and efficient parameter estimates. 
Using the moment conditions presented in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8), we 
employ a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure to generate consistent 
                                                 
2 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator relates to measurement error: differencing may exacerbate 
the bias due to errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
 
3 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most recent difference is 
used as instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in redundant moment 
conditions. (see Arellano and Bover 1995). 
   11
estimates of the parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano 
and Bond 1991, and Arellano and Bover 1995).  These are given by the following 
formulas: 
 
y Z Z X X Z Z X ’ ￿ ’ ) ’ ￿ ’ ( ￿ 1 1 1 − − − Ω Ω = θ         ( 9 )  
1 1 ) ’ ￿ ’ ( ) ￿ (
− − Ω = X Z Z X AVAR θ          ( 1 0 )  
 
where θ  is the vector of parameters of interest (α , β ),  y is the dependent variable stacked 
first in differences and then in levels,  X is the explanatory-variable matrix (including the 
lagged dependent variable, that is, [yt-1, X]) stacked first in differences and then in levels, 
Z is the matrix of instruments derived from the moment conditions, and Ω ￿ is a consistent 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
4 
  The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the crime-rate regression. We address this 
issue by considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, 
which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the 
moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
gives support to the model. The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error 
term  ε i,t  is not serially correlated. As in the case of the Sargan test, the model 
specification is supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected.  In the system 
specification we test whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of the 
regression in differences) is second-order serially correlated.  First-order serial 
correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in 
levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  Second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially 
                                                 
4 In practice, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step procedure to obtain consistent and efficient 
GMM estimates.  First, assume that the residuals, ε i,t, are independent and homoskedastic both across countries and 
over time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is used to produce first-step coefficient 
estimates. Then, construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions with the 
residuals obtained in the first step, and use this matrix to re-estimate the parameters of interest (i.e. second-step 
estimates). Asymptotically, the second-step estimates are superior to the first-step ones in so far as efficiency is 
concerned.   12
correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order one. This would reject 
the appropriateness of the proposed instruments (and would call for higher-order lags to 
be used as instruments). 
 
Results 
  Tables 2 and 3 report the growth regression results.  We study how the effect of 
financial intermediation on growth varies in the presence of financial turmoil by 
including a slope dummy for countries that have suffered a banking crisis (Table 2).  
Furthermore, in order to reconsider De Gregorio and Guidotti￿s findings, we also assess 
the effect of a slope dummy for Latin American and Caribbean countries (Table 3).  Of 
the 74 countries in the sample, 31 experienced at least one banking crisis and 20 belonged 
to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  All but 3 countries in LAC suffered a 
banking crisis (see Appendix B for further details).  In each case, we work with two 
indicators of financial intermediation, namely, the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and 
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. 
  The GMM regression results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  Note that according 
to both specification tests, Sargan and 2
nd-order serial correlation, the null hypothesis of 
the validity of the moment conditions cannot be rejected.   
The estimation results confirm the positive growth effect of larger financial depth.  
As Table 2 indicates, this effect is significantly positive for the samples of non-crisis and 
crisis countries.  However, as the size and significance of the slope dummy coefficient 
reveals, the positive growth effect is statistically smaller for crisis than for non-crisis 
countries.  This is true for both indicators of financial intermediation (i.e., liquid 
liabilities and private domestic credit).  In Table 3, we reconsider De Gregorio and 
Guidotti￿s results.  We agree with them that the growth effect of financial deepening is 
smaller in Latin American countries than in the rest.  However, we find that even for 
Latin American countries an expansion of financial intermediation, as measured in the 
frequencies of five-year averages, leads to higher growth rates.  Qualitatively, the results 
obtained with the slope dummies for crisis and LAC countries are similar.   
Quantitatively, the coefficient on the interactive term for crisis countries is larger than   13
that for LAC countries, which may be due to the fact that Latin America accounts for 
only about half of all crisis countries. 
In summary, the estimated growth effect of financial deepening is smaller, but 





                                                 
5 The results reported above are obtained using only the closest appropriate lag for each variable in the 
regression.  We could use only one instrument per variable because if we used more, we would run into an 
overfitting problem (reflected on implausibly large Sargan test statistics with p-values close to 1).   
Overfitting would occur because the number of instrumental variables is too large compared to the number 
of available cross-sectional units.  In order to assess the robustness of our basic results to the lag structure 
of the instruments, we need to restrict the set of explanatory variables (to avoid the overfitting problem).  
We then consider two lags for each variable as instruments, using alternatively the two closest lags to the 
regression period and the two lags separated by one period from the regression. The results of this exercise 
are presented in Appendix E.  They confirm our basic results, that is, the effect of financial deepening on 
growth is always positive but significantly smaller in crisis-countries. 
TABLE 2: Financial Intermediation, Crisis Experience and Growth; system estimator
Regressors Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
Constant 0.751883 1.0316 3.06879 0.9624
Log of Initial Income per Capita -0.204635 0.1096 0.10722 0.1226
Average year of secondary schooling 0.477162 0.1463 0.14471 0.1519
Liquid Liabilities 2.086862 0.1837
Liquid Liabilities*Crisis Experience -0.379457 0.0414
Private Credit 1.43412 0.0634
Private Credit*Crisis Experience -0.26059 0.0411
Government size -1.187689 0.2865 -1.90475 0.2665
Inflation Rate 0.325441 0.3941 -0.39897 0.3056
Black Market Premium -1.980017 0.09 -1.18752 0.0859
Dummy 71-75 -0.833267 0.08 -0.98195 0.0642
Dummy 76-80 -0.882677 0.1251 -0.96971 0.1158
Dummy 81-85 -3.043068 0.1322 -2.96185 0.1672
Dummy 86-90 -2.074279 0.1594 -2.01945 0.1674
Dummy 91-95 -2.867901 0.1776 -2.77716 0.1637
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.467   0.41
2nd Order Serial Correlation (P-Value) 0.836   0.642
Number of Countries 74 74
Number of Obsevations 359 359  14
 
 
III. SHORT- AND LONG-RUN GROWTH EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL DEEPENING   
In this section we attempt an empirical explanation of the apparently 
contradictory effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.  This explanation 
is based on the distinction between cycle and trend changes of financial intermediation 
and their corresponding effects on output growth.  Instead of averaging the data to isolate 
trend effects, we estimate both long- and short-run effects using annual data in a panel 
containing a large sample of countries.  Our method can be summarized as a panel, error-
correction model, where long- and short-run effects are estimated jointly from a general 
autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) model.    
We propose this panel error-correction method as an alternative to the traditional 
method of time averaging for the following reasons.  First, while averaging clearly 
induces a loss of information, it is not obvious that averaging over fixed-length intervals 
effectively eliminates business-cycle fluctuations.  Second, averaging eliminates 
information that may be used to estimate a more flexible model that allows for some 
parameter heterogeneity across countries.  Third, and most importantly for our purposes, 
TABLE 3: Financial Intermediation,Latin America and Growth; system estimator
Regressors Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error
Constant 2.074185 0.9213 5.379823 0.9257
Log of Initial Income per Capita -0.181326 0.0955 -0.036462 0.1106
Average year of secondary schooling 0.592854 0.1141 0.434511 0.1289
Liquid Liabilities 2.098478 0.1586
Liquid Liabilities*Latin America -0.203884 0.0498
Private Credit 1.557448 0.073
Private Credit*Latin America -0.199361 0.053
Government size -1.946623 0.1978 -2.665188 0.2506
Inflation Rate 0.363155 0.357 -0.287723 0.2191
Black Market Premium -1.741312 0.0957 -1.111259 0.0933
Dummy 71-75 -0.923225 0.0941 -1.03786 0.129
Dummy 76-80 -1.070274 0.1002 -1.146228 0.1307
Dummy 81-85 -3.103926 0.1268 -3.131746 0.19
Dummy 86-90 -2.271343 0.1176 -2.261626 0.1375
Dummy 91-95 -3.18211 0.1357 -3.154942 0.1465
Sargan Test (P-value) 0.467   0.461
2nd Order Serial Correlation (P-Value) 0.836   0.655
Number of Countries 74 74
Number of Obsevations 359 359  15
averaging hides the dynamic relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
activity, particularly the presence of opposite effects at different time frequencies.
6    
A. Methodology 
Empirical estimation poses two issues.  The first is the need to separate and 
estimate short- and long-run effects without being able to decompose directly trend and 
transitory components of growth, financial intermediation, and the other explanatory 
variables.  We treat this issue below in the context of single-country estimation.  The 
second issue is the likely possibility that the parameters in the relationship between 
financial intermediation and economic activity be different across countries.  It can be 
argued that country heterogeneity is particularly relevant in short-run relationships, given 
that countries are affected by overlending and financial crises to widely different degrees.  
On the other hand, we can expect that long-run relationships would be more 
homogeneous across countries.  We discuss below the issue of heterogeneity in the 
context of multi-country estimation. 
  Single-country estimation 
As said above, we face the challenge to estimate long- and short-run relationships 
without being able to observe the long- and short-run components of the variables 
involved.  Over the last decade or so, a booming cointegration literature has focused on 
the estimation of long-run relationships among I(1) variables (Johanssen 1995, Phillips 
and Hansen 1990).  From this literature, two common misconceptions have been derived.  
The first one is that long-run relationships exist only in the context of cointegration of 
integrated variables.  The second one is that standard methods of estimation and inference 
are incorrect.  Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) have argued 
against both misconceptions, showing how small modifications to standard methods can 
render consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters in a long-run relationship 
between both integrated and stationary variables.  Furthermore, the methods proposed by 
Pesaran and co-authors avoid the need for pre-testing and order-of-integration 
conformability given that they are valid whether or not the variables of interest are I(0) or 
I(1).  The main requirements for the validity of this methodology are that, first, there exist 
                                                 
6 Similar arguments are made by Attanasio, Scorcu, and Picci (2000) in their cross-country study on the 
dynamic relationship between saving, investment, and growth.   16
a long-run relationship among the variables of interest and, second, the dynamic 
specification of the model be augmented such that the regressors are strictly exogenous 
and the resulting residual is not serially correlated.  For reasons that will become apparent 
shortly, Pesaran and co-authors call their method ￿an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) approach￿ to long-run modelling. 
As an illustration, consider the following simple bivariate model:  
t t t t cX by a y ν + + + = − − 1 1          (1) 
t t t X X ε ρ γ + + = − 1           (2) 
where yt, the decision variable, is the per capita GDP growth rate in year t; and X, the 
forcing variable, represents a set of growth determinants including financial depth and 
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The first point to note is that X does not depend on past values of y (beyond its 
dependence on previous values of X).  If a more general process for X were allowed, the 
long-run relationship between the two variables would not be unique.  That is, both 
variables would be endogenous and additional identification assumptions would be 
needed to discern between various long-run relationships.
7  Since multiple long-run 
relationships are beyond the scope of this paper, we restrict the dynamic process for X to 
be purely autoregressive. 
The second point to note is that the existence of a long-run relationship requires 
the process for y to be stable, which in this simple example entails that |b|<1.  Notice that 
once we have restricted the process of X to be purely autoregressive, the existence of a 
long-run relationship does not rely on whether X is I (0) or I(1); that is, there is no 
restriction on whether ρ =1.  Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000) present a test for the null 
hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship when it is not known a priori whether X 
                                                 
7 See Hsiao (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).   17
is I(0) or I(1).  The test consists on examining the null that b=1 against the alternative that 
|b|<1. 
In order to be able to derive the long-run relationship between y and X, we must 
obtain a dynamic regression equation in which, first, the regression residual is serially 
uncorrelated and, second, the regressors, X, are strictly exogenous (that is, independent of 
the residuals at all leads and lags.)  Given the assumptions on the distributional properties 
of the residuals ν  and ε   (equation 3), the requisite that the residuals be serially 
uncorrelated is met in our simple example. If this were not the case, we would need to 
augment the lag order in (1) and (2) until the residuals become serially independent 
(Pesaran and Shin 1999).  The second pre-requisite to derive a long-run relationship is, 
however, not met in our simple example ￿X is not strictly exogenous given that the non-
zero correlation between the shocks entails a contemporaneous feedback between y and 
X.  As explained by Pesaran and Shin (1999), the way to control for this 
contemporaneous feedback is also to augment the dynamic specification in (6).  The 
purpose of augmenting the regression equation is to replace the (correlated) residual ν  
with a linear predictor based on leads and lags of X  and a new residual that by 
construction is independent of X.  In our simple example, we model the contemporaneous 
correlation between ν t and ε t by a linear regression of ν t on ε t as follows, 











=           (4) 
where (σ νε /σ εε ) represents the population coefficient of the regression, and η t is 
distributed independently from ε t. 
Substitute the above expression for ν t into equation (1).  Then, using the AR 
model for X, express ε t in terms of Xt and Xt-1.  The ensuing regression equation is an 
auto-regressive distributed lag model (ARDL) for y from which a long-run relationship 
can be derived.  The resulting ARDL (1,1) for y is given by, 
































− = − − 1 1      (5) 
Note that the original process for y (equation 1) is now augmented by the inclusion of the 
additional regressor Xt.     18
The error-correction model (ECM) implied by the ARDL (1,1) given above can 
be expressed as, 
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− − − = ∆ − − 1 1 1
1
1
) 1 (  (6) 
Where the expression in brackets is the error-correction term and (1-b) is the speed of 
adjustment. 
Therefore, the long-run (steady-state) relationship implied by the dynamic system 
in equations (1)-(4) is given by, 
()
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or,  ∗ ∗ + + = η β α x y   * . 
  The presentation of this simple empirical model serves to highlight the 
assumptions and properties of the ARDL method proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), 
Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran and Shin (1999) for the estimation of a long-run 
relationship.  The advantage of the method is that standard estimation and inference can 
be used regardless of whether the regressors are stationary or integrated.  The main 
assumption is that there exist a single long-run relationship between the endogenous and 
forcing variables.
8  The pre-requisites for consistent and efficient estimation are that the 
shocks in the dynamic specification be serially uncorrelated and that the forcing variables 
be strictly exogenous.  As we illustrated, the pre-requisites can be met by augmenting 
sufficiently the lag order of the dynamic regression equation.  The resulting equation will 
generally be an ARDL(p, q) model of sufficiently large lag order. 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that this assumption underlies implicitly the various single-equation based estimators of 
long-run relationships commonly found in the cointegration literature. Without such assumption, these 
estimators would at best identify some linear combination of all the long-run relationships present in the 
data.   19
Multi-country estimation 
Our empirical samples below are characterized by time-series (T) and cross-
section (N) dimensions of relatively large size. In such conditions, there are a number of 
alternative methods for multi-country estimation, which allow for different degrees of 
parameter heterogeneity across countries.  At one extreme, the fully heterogeneous-
coefficient model imposes no cross-country parameter restrictions and can be estimated 
on a country-by-country basis -- provided the time-series dimension of the data is 
sufficiently large.  When, in addition, the cross-country dimension is large, the mean of 
long- and short-run coefficients across countries can be estimated consistently by the 
unweighted average of the individual country coefficients.  This is the ￿mean group￿ 
(MG) estimator introduced by Pesaran, Smith, and Im (1996).  At the other extreme, the 
fully homogeneous-coefficient model requires that all slope and intercept coefficients be 
equal across countries.  This is the simple ￿pooled￿ estimator. 
In between the two extremes, there are a variety of estimators.  The ￿dynamic 
fixed effects￿ estimator restricts all slope coefficients to be equal across countries but 
allows for different country intercepts.  The ￿pooled mean group￿ (PMG) estimator, 
introduced by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), restricts the long-run coefficients to be 
the same across countries but allows the short-run coefficients (including the speed of 
adjustment) to be country specific. The PMG estimator also generates consistent 
estimates of the mean of short-run coefficients across countries by taking the unweighted 
average of the individual country coefficients (provided that the cross-sectional 
dimension is large).   
The choice among these estimators faces a general trade-off between consistency 
and efficiency. Estimators that impose cross-country constraints dominate the 
heterogeneous estimators in terms of efficiency if the restrictions are valid. If they are 
false, however, the restricted estimators are inconsistent. In particular, imposing invalid 
parameter homogeneity in dynamic models typically leads to downward-biased estimates 
of the speed of adjustment (Robertson and Symons 1992, Pesaran and Smith 1995). 
For our purposes, the pooled mean group estimator offers the best available 
compromise in the search for consistency and efficiency.  This estimator is particularly 
useful when the long run is given by conditions expected to be homogeneous across   20
countries while the short-run adjustment depends on country characteristics such as 
financial development, institutional quality, and relative price flexibility.  Furthermore, 
the PMG estimator is sufficiently flexible to allow for long-run coefficient homogeneity 
over only a subset of variables and/or countries.  
In view of these considerations, we use the PMG method to estimate a long-run 
relationship that is common across countries while allowing for unrestricted country 
heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics.  The interested reader is referred to Pesaran, 
Shin, and Smith (1999) where the PMG estimator is developed and compared with the 
MG estimator. Briefly, the PMG estimator proceeds as follows.  The estimation of the 
long-run coefficients is done jointly across countries through a (concentrated) maximum 
likelihood procedure.  Then the estimation of short-run coefficients (including the speed 
of adjustment), country-specific intercepts, and country-specific error variances is done 
on a country-by-country basis, also through maximum likelihood and using the estimates 
of the long-run coefficients previously obtained.
9  
An important assumption for the consistency of our PMG estimates is the 
independence of the regression residuals across countries.  In practice, non-zero error 
covariances usually arise from omitted common factors that influence the countries￿ 
ARDL processes.  We seek to eliminate these common factors and, thus, ensure the 
independence condition by allowing for time-specific effects in the estimated regression; 
this is equivalent to a regression in which each variable enters as deviations with respect 
to the cross-sectional mean in a particular year. 
                                                 
9 The comparison of the asymptotic properties of PMG and MG estimates can be put also in terms of the 
general trade-off between consistency and efficiency noted in the text.  If the long-run coefficients are in 
fact equal across countries, then the PMG estimates will be consistent and efficient, whereas the MG 
estimates will only be consistent.  If, on the other hand, the long-run coefficients are not equal across 
countries, then the PMG estimates will be inconsistent, whereas the MG estimator will still provide a 
consistent estimate of the mean of long-run coefficients across countries. The long-run homogeneity 
restrictions can be tested using Hausman or likelihood ratio tests to compare the PMG and MG estimates of 
the long run coefficients. In turn, comparison of the small sample properties of these estimators relies on 
their sensitivity to outliers.  In small samples (low T and N), the MG estimator, being an unweighted 
average, is excessively sensitive to the inclusion of outlying country estimates (for instance those obtained 
with small T).  The PMG estimator performs better in this regard because it produces estimates that are 
similar to weighted averages of the respective country-specific estimates, where the weights are given 
according to their precision (that is, the inverse of their corresponding variance-covariance matrix). 
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B. Data and Results 
The sample consists of 49 countries with annual data for the period 1960-97 (see 
Appendix B for the list of countries included in the sample).  Given the procedure￿s 
requirements on the time-series dimension of the data, we include only countries that 
have at least 20 consecutive observations.  The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
GDP per capita.  The measures of financial intermediation are liquid liabilities and 
private domestic credit, both as ratios to GDP.  The control variables are the initial level 
of GDP per capita, government consumption (as ratio to GDP),  the volume of trade (as 
ratio to GDP), and the inflation rate.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results on specification tests and the estimation of long- 
and short-run parameters linking per capita GDP growth, financial intermediation, and 
other growth determinants.  In Table 4 the measure of financial intermediation is the ratio 
of private domestic credit to GDP, and in Table 5 it is the ratio of liquid liabilities to 
GDP.  In both tables, we present the results obtained using the pooled mean group (PMG) 
estimator, which we prefer given its gains in consistency and efficiency over other panel 
error-correction estimators.  For comparison purposes, we also present the results 
obtained with the mean group (MG) and the dynamic fixed-effects (DFE) estimators. 
As outlined in the previous section, the consistency and efficiency of the PMG 
estimates relies on several specification conditions.  The first are that the regression 
residuals be serially uncorrelated and that the explanatory variables can be treated as 
exogenous.  We seek to fulfill these conditions by including in the ARDL model, three 
lags of the growth rate, 3 lags of the measure of finance intermediation, and one lag of 
each control variable.  We could not expand the lag structure any further because we 
would run into problems of lack of degrees of freedom.  We chose to use a richer (longer) 
lag structure for the dependent variable (growth) and the variable of interest (financial 
intermediation) because our main concern was to characterize their long- and short-run 
relationships.       
The second specification condition is that both country-specific effects and cross-
country common factors be accounted for.  We control for country-specific effects by 
allowing for an intercept for each country, and we attempt to eliminate cross-country   22
common factors by demeaning the data using the corresponding cross-sectional means 
for every period (which is algebraically the same as allowing for year-specific intercepts).   
The third condition refers to the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic 
stability) and requires that the coefficient on the error-correction term be negative.  In the 
second panel of Tables 4 and 5, we report the estimates for the pooled error-correction 
coefficient and its corresponding standard error.  This coefficient is significantly negative 
in the PMG estimator (and in dynamic fixed effects), which is evidence that supports the 
dynamic stability of the model.   
The fourth condition is that the long-run parameters be the same across countries.  
As explained in the econometric methodology section, we can test the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity through a Hausman-type test; this is based on the comparison between the 
Pooled Mean Group and the Mean Group estimators.  In Tables 4 and 5, we present the 
Hausman test statistic and the corresponding p-values for the coefficients on each of the 
explanatory variables and for all of them jointly.  When the proxy for financial 
intermediation is private credit (Table 4), the homogeneity restriction is never rejected, 
either for individual parameters or jointly.  When we use instead liquid liabilities (Table 
5), the homogeneity of long-run parameters is not rejected except in the case of the 
coefficient on the inflation rate.  
  
Regarding the estimated parameters, our analysis focuses on those obtained with 
the PMG estimator.  In the long run, the growth rate of GDP per capita is negatively 
related to initial income, the size of government, and the inflation rate, and positively 
related to international trade openness.  These are standard results from the empirical 
growth literature, and it is reassuring that we are able to reproduce them with our 
methodology.   
Most importantly for our purposes, we find that economic growth is positively 
and significantly linked to the measures of financial intermediation in the long run. On 
the other hand, the short-run coefficients tell a different story.  As explained in the 
methodology section, short-run coefficients are not restricted to be the same across 
countries, so that we do not have a single pooled estimate for each coefficient.   
Nevertheless, we can still analyze the average short-run effect by considering the mean   23
of the corresponding coefficients across countries.  We find that the short-run average 
relationship between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the measures of financial 
intermediation appears to be strongly negative in the case of private credit and mildly so 
in the case of liquid liabilities.  Thus, comparing the long- and short-run estimates, we 
can conclude that the sign of the relationship between economic growth and financial 
intermediation depends on whether their movements are cyclical or permanent.   
Table 4: ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1); Dependant Variable: Growth; Financial Indicator: Private Credit/GDP
Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group estimators and Dynamic Fixed Effect, controlling for country and time effects
Sample: All Countries 1961-1997
  
Pooled Mean Group   Mean Group   Hausman Tests Dynamic Fixed Effect
Variabels Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. h-test p-val Coef. St.Er.
Long-Run Coefficients
Private Credit 0.741 0.349 0.032 7.235 0.01 0.92 1.6063 0.9594
Initial Income  -7.042 0.738 -23.06 15.493 1.07 0.3 -3.717 0.9322
Governement Size -5.359 0.545 -1.76 3.423 1.13 0.29 -2.6075 0.7248
Trade Openness 3.614 0.352 0.966 4.127 0.41 0.52 3.9511 0.6987
Inflation Rate -3.383 0.411 -3.141 3.805 0 0.95 -2.9602 0.4325
Joint Hausman Test 6.78 0.24
Error Correction Coefficients
Phi -0.964 0.099 -2.159 0.149 -0.8538 0.0484
Short-Run Coefficients     
∆growth(-1) 0.127 0.067 1.878 0.734 0.043 1.6642
∆growth(-2) -0.071 0.04 -1.773 0.232 0.0417 -1.8276
∆Private Credit -15.236 8.54 -1.784 -8.908 1.6453 -2.1842
∆Private Credit(-1) 6.332 5.768 1.098 -3.827 1.1872 -1.1897
∆Private Credit(-2) -7.553 6.975 -1.083 -12.859 1.7477 -2.7131
∆Initial Income  -8.889 3.099 -2.869 -3.764 2.7932 -1.449
∆governement -14.503 2.526 -8.685 3.134 -1.916 1.11
∆trade -3.055 1.672 -1.827 -7.938 2.7932 -1.449
∆inflation -5.06 1.641 -3.084 3.824 1.4129 -2.6074
Inpt 0.022 1.425 0.015 16.332
 
No. Countries 48 48 48
No.Observations 1211 1211 1211
Avg RBarSq 0.65 0.68 0.68  24
  
 
Finally, we consider the question as to whether the negative short-run relationship 
between growth and financial intermediation can be linked to the occurrence of systemic 
banking crisis.  We address this question by examining the short-run coefficients on 
financial intermediation for each country in the sample. We separate the countries with 
significant short-run effects in two groups: those that experienced a systemic banking 
crisis and those that did not.  Figure 2a plots the short-run coefficients for the crisis 
countries and Figure 2b, for the non-crisis ones.  We can see that seventy-five percent of 
the crisis countries present a negative short-run relationship between growth and financial 
intermediation, while only forty-four percent of the non-crisis countries do.  Therefore, 
Table 5: ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1); Dependant Variable: Growth; Financial Indicator: Liquid Liabilities/GDP
Pooled Mean Group, Mean Group estimators and Dynamic Fixed Effect, controlling for country and time effects
Sample: All Countries 1961-1997
Pooled Mean Group   Mean Group   Hausman Tests Dynamic Fixed Effect
Variables Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. h-test p-val Coef. St.Er.
Long-Run Coefficients
Liquid Liabilities 1.677 0.526 -4.506 26.511 0.05 0.82 0.3226 1.5346
Initial Income  -8.119 0.529 1.447 11.629 0.68 0.41 -3.1004 0.8602
Governement Size -0.751 0.502 -6.541 5.889 0.97 0.32 -2.3901 0.7706
Trade Openness 1.077 0.456 10.051 4.393 4.23 0.04 3.9237 0.6802
Inflation Rate -3.362 0.486 -5.979 13.038 0.04 0.84 -3.1331 0.4465
Joint Hausman Test 9.5 0.11
Error Correction Coefficients
Phi -0.861 0.084 -1.788 0.149 -0.8406 0.0472
Short-Run Coefficients     
∆growth(-1) 0.076 0.054 0.467 0.106 0.0984 0.0379
∆growth(-2) -0.053 0.039 0.097 0.063 -0.0542 0.028
∆liquid_Liabilities -22.177 8.048 -7.626 25.191 -15.7766 2.8192
∆liquid_Liabilities(-1) 17.716 7.11 4.199 21.24 12.16 2.9951
∆liquid_Liabilities(-2) -2.588 4.84 -12.56 17.576 -5.7187 2.8335
∆Initial Income  -8.043 3.008 -7.236 4.025 -4.6441 2.2555
∆governement -13.242 2.868 -5.8 2.862 -1.6355 0.9049
∆trade -0.747 2.152 -8.657 2.327 -2.4328 0.938
∆inflation -6.19 4.176 15.862 5.394 -2.4466 0.5318
∆inflation (-1) 60.921 6.114 119.028 52.686 0.7388 0.8909
Inpt 57.06 5.992 104.47 50.76
No. Countries 49 49 49
No.Observations 1235 1235 1235
Avg RBarSq 0.64 0.68 0.44  25
boom-bust credit cycles appear to explain in part the average negative effect of short-run 
financial intermediation.  However, this negative effect appears to occur more generally 
and can be also linked to experiences of soft-landing after credit booms.
10   
 
                                                 
10 See Tornell and Westermann (2001) for a model that explains the cycles of credit expansions and 
contractions by focusing on the dynamics of credit constraints in the non-tradable sector.  They conclude 
that a short-run negative correlation between financial intermediation and growth can reflect not only 
financial crises but also episodes where lending booms end gradually.   
Figure 2a :Short Run Growth Effects of Financial Development
Countries with systemic crisis experience
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Figure 2b: Short Run Growth Effects of Financial Development
Countries with no systemic crisis experience
Liquid Liabilities/GDP
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  The results in this paper can be summarized as follows.   
•  The dynamic relationship between economic growth and financial intermediation is 
negative around financial crises.  Furthermore, the positive link between ￿long-run￿ 
economic growth and financial deepening is smaller in countries that have suffered 
banking crises than in the rest.    
•  Using recent econometric methods for the estimation of dynamic models using panel 
data, we find that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation 
and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship.  We 
propose this result as an empirical explanation for the apparent contradiction between 
the crisis literature and the endogenous-growth literature on the effects of financial 
deepening.   
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Explanations￿, unpublished. APPENDIX A:LIST OF SYTEMIC BANKING CRISES*
Country Name Start End Start End Start End
Algeria 1990 1992
Argentina 1980 1982 1989 1990 1995 1995
Benin 1988 1990
Bolivia 1986 1987 1994 2000
Brazil 1990 1990 1994 1996
Burkina Faso 1988 1994
Cameroon 1987 1993 1995 1998
Central African Republic 1988 1999
Chad 1992 1992
Chile 1976 1976 1981 1983
Colombia 1982 1987
Congo, Rep. 1992 2000
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 1991
Czech Republic 1989 1991
Ecuador 1996 2000
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977 1985








Kenya 1985 1989 1992 1992 1993 1995
















Russian Federation 1995 1995 1998 1998
Senegal 1988 1991
Slovak Republic 1991 2000
Slovenia 1992 1994
Spain 1977 1985






Zaire 1991 1992 1994 2000
Zimbabwe 1995 1995
Source: Caprio and Klingbiel (1999)
* Here are only listed countries for which we get a precise time period for Banking Crises. Appendix B
systemic banking crisis Latin American and Carribean GMM Sample Pooled Mean Group Sample
 Algeria X X




Bolivia X X X
Brazil X X X
Cameroun X X X
Canada X X
Central African Republic X X
Chile X X X X
Colombia X X X X
Costa Rica X X X
Cyprus X
Denmark X X
Dominican Republic X X X
Ecuador X X X X
Egypt X X X
El Salvador X X X




Ghana X X X
Great Britain X X
Greece X X















Malaysia X X X
Mauritius X X
Mexico X X X X
Netherlands X X






Papua New Guinea X
Paraguay X X X X
Peru X X X X




Sierra Leone X X
South Africa X X
Spain X X X
Sri Lanka X X X
Sudan X




Thailand X X X
Togo X
Trinidad and Tobago X
United States of America X X
Uruguay X X X X
Venezuela X X X X
Zaire X X X
Zimbabwe X X
total 31 21 75 49Appendix C: Variables and Sources
Variable Definition Original source  Secondary source
Level and growth rate of GDP Real per capita GDP World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
Real per capita GDP (for initial GDP in cross-section 
regressions)
Penn World Tables
Government size Government expenditure as share of GDP World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
Openness to trade Sum of real exports and imports as share of real GDP World Development Indicators Loayza et al. (1998)
Inflation rate Log difference of Consumer Price Index International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), line 64
Average years of schooling Average years of  schooling in the population over 25 Barro and Lee (1996)
Average years of secondary 
schooling
Average years of  secondary schooling in the population 
over 15
Barro and Lee (1996)
Black market premium Ratio of black market exchange rate and official exchange 
rate minus one
Pick's Currency Yearbook 
through 1989 ; and World 
Currency Yearbook.
Liquid Liabilities {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)], 
where F is liquid liabilities (line 55l), GDP is line 99b, P_e 
is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average 
annual CPI.
IFS
Commercial-Central Bank DBA(t) / (DBA(t) + CBA(t)), where DBA is assets of 
deposit money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is central 
bank assets (lines 12 a-d).
IFS
Private Credit {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)], 
where F is credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to the private sector (lines 22d + 
42d), GDP is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) 
and P_a is the average CPI for the year.
IFSAppendix D : 1960-1997 ANNUAL DATA CORRELATION (five year average data correlation in parenthesis)
com lly pc growth inf gov school trade bmp initial
com 1.00
lly 0.47  (0.51) 1.00    
pc 0.55  (0.6) 0.84 (0.84) 1.00  
growth 0.21  (0.33) 0.15 (0.22) 0.14 (0.2) 1.00
inf -0.2  (0.6) -0.2 (-0.26) -0.1 (-0.26) -0.2 (-0.29) 1.00
gov 0.24 (0.6) 0.37 (0.21) 0.27 (0.24) -0.0 (-0.04) -0.11 1.00
school 0.31 0.56 0.56 0.09 (0.13) 0.03 0.41 1.00
trade 0.26 (0.6) 0.16 (0.13) 0.08 (0.09) 0.05 (0.13) -0.16 0.48 0.05 1.00
bmp -0.3 (0.6) -0.1 (-0.03) -0.2 (0.22) -0.1 (-0.2) 0.26 -0.13 -0.10 -0.21 1.00
initial income 0.52 (0.6) 0.62 (0.61) 0.55 (0.76) 0.14 (-0.14) -0.11 0.43 0.80 0.08 -0.23 1.00
OBS 2656.00 2509.00 2521.00 2612.00 2577.00 1551.00 2484.00 2620.00 2576.00 2766.00
5 year avg OBS 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00 359.00
VARIABLES
com = Commercial Banks Assets /(Central Banks + Commercial Banks Assets)
lly = Liquid Liabilities / GDP
pc = Private Credit/ GDP
growth= real per capita Growth
inf = inflation rate
gov= governement expenditures / GDP
school = average year of secondary education
trade = trade openess
bmp=black market premium
initial income = beginning of the period real per capita incomeAPPENDIX E : Robustness Check for GMM system estimation in Section II.B
Financial Intermediation, Crisis Experience and Growth
GMM sytem estimator GMM sytem estimator GMM sytem estimator
4 instruments: t-2 8 instruments: t-2,t-3 8 instruments: t-3,t-4
Regressors coef std error coef std error coef std error
Inititial Income 0.15 0.23 0.02 0.185 0.09 0.14
private credit 1.89 0.38 2.11 0.29 1.86 0.23
private credit*crisis -0.23 0.09 -0.29 0.05 -0.2 0.05
governement size -3.04 0.67 -3.87 0.49 -2.76 0.45
Sargan Test
degree of freedom 29 41 41
P-Value 0.198 0.25 0.48
 Second Order correlation
P-Value 0.12 0.12 0.125
Number of Countries 74 74 74
Number of Observation 359 359 359